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Theory and Accountability: The Case of Government 
Consolidated Financial Reporting 
 
Victoria Wise1 
 
The objective in this study is to examine the existing 
literature regarding the antecedents to public sector 
accountability performance by including a new variable: 
preparer-commanders’ beliefs about the usefulness of 
whole-of-government consolidated financial reporting. 
Goldberg’s (1965) Commander Theory was used as a 
relevant theoretical framework. Survey results provided 
insights into the beliefs of preparer-commanders as to the 
usefulness of whole-of-government consolidated financial 
reports for the discharge of accountability. While there 
appears to be a view that such reports may be useful for 
decision-making purposes, there is relatively less 
evidence to suggest that this type of information is 
suitable for the purposes of government resource 
allocation decisions. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The idea of a state, formed by individuals who have united together, and which is 
governed by elected individuals, implies the existence of a social contract between 
the electors and the elected (Runes, 1962:p293). As ownership of the state‟s 
resources does not exist in any legal sense, control over those resources and, thus 
accountability for them is conferred by the individuals who form the state, on those 
elected to govern the state. Whether consolidated financial information is useful for 
the discharge of accountability for such resources is examined in this study. 
 
1.1 Commander theory 
 
Commander theory as posited by Goldberg (1965:pp162-7) could help in this 
examination. Commander theory rests on the assumption that although an owner of 
resources may also be the controller of those resources, ownership and control are 
separate notions. That is, ownership is a legal condition, but control is a function that 
can only be exercised by human beings. Ownership of resources is sometimes, but 
not always accompanied by effective economic control of those resources and this 
function of controlling or managing resources can be thought of as distinct from the 
legal or even social ownership of them (Goldberg 1965:p162). 
 
Goldberg (1965:p166) defines control over resources as a command and, in respect 
to government, identifies Parliamentary Ministers as commanders at the top level of 
a hierarchical system of command. Invoking commander theory, if resources of the 
state are allocated to specific government organisations or for certain activities and 
functions, they are ultimately controlled by an individual commander who is a 
Minister and who is also responsible and accountable for those resources. Goldberg 
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also envisaged lower levels of command. These comprised permanent Heads of 
Department who guide the policy of Ministers. Effectively, they are commanders in 
this respect as well as in their capacity of carrying out policy decisions. Goldberg 
(1965:p167) submitted that accounting reports are prepared by lower-level 
commanders to commanders at a higher level to serve many purposes. For instance: 
to provide documentary evidence for decisions made by commanders; for control of 
activities relating to resources; to enable decisions to be made by resource 
controllers; and, to allow decisions to be made on a basis of reasoned interpretation 
rather than guesswork. 
 
Commander theory forms a theoretical foundation in which to analyse the impact of a 
cross-sector transfer of accounting principles and rules to the public sector. It 
provides a strategic posture toward financial report disclosure activities and assists 
in developing an understanding of the relative power of report preparers‟ on levels of 
financial report disclosure. This theoretical framework can be used to help explain 
whether certain environmental artefacts constitute significant impediments to the 
cross-sector transfer of the consolidated financial reporting practice to the public 
sector. Specifically, it provides an examination of the beliefs of the top-level and 
lower-level commanders as to the usefulness of consolidated financial reports for 
accountability purposes. 
 
Goldberg‟s top-level commanders use consolidated financial reports to discharge 
their accountability for government resources under their control. They constitute the 
primary financial report user group in this study and will be described as „user-
commanders‟. Heads of Departments are authoritative public sector policy-makers in 
respect to guidance for financial report content and preparation. They are described 
as „dominant preparer-commanders‟ in this study. Public sector officials responsible 
for the compilation and exercise of judgment in the preparation of such reports, and 
the Auditors-General responsible for monitoring the reporting process and the output 
of that process are described as „subordinate preparer-commanders‟. 
 
1.2 Consolidated financial reporting 
 
Consolidated financial reporting is an accounting technique in which two or more 
individual entities are reported as if they are one common entity. In order to prepare 
consolidated financial reports, separate sets of accounting reports are aggregated 
and certain other adjustments made to arrive at consolidated totals. For instance 
inter-entity security holdings are eliminated, as are inter-entity transactions and the 
profits (or losses) (Chambers 1969:pp631-2). Consolidated financial reporting in the 
Australian private sector has been regulated by an accounting standard since June 
1992 however it was not until June 1999 that this particular form of financial reporting 
was required to be applied by Australian government entities at the whole-of-
government level. 
 
1.3 Accountability and usefulness 
 
A substantial body of literature exists on accountability and performance, much of it 
having been produced across the last four decades. What stands out in the relevant 
literature is the multiplicity of views with respect to the notion of accountability, and 
the nature of relationships between these factors and the practice of consolidated 
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financial reporting (Simms, 1999). Some researchers in this field have implied that 
this is partly due to the poor conceptualisation of the nature of accountability and the 
weak theoretical foundation of the consolidated financial reporting literature (Walker, 
1976:p114). The accounting regulators clearly link the concepts of control and 
accountability and view control as the appropriate criterion for determining the 
components of the whole-of-government entity for the purposes of providing useful 
financial information. However, what appears to be lacking are models of 
accountability and of consolidated financial reporting that can be viewed as superior 
or that are generally favoured in the literature. 
 
In the Australian public sector, Ministerial Heads of Departments are accountable to 
an elected assembly of Parliamentary Ministers (Birch, 1996:p20), and at a party 
level to the governing party (Lucy, 1993:p3). The Auditors-General provide 
assurance as to the accountability of public sector operations and performance, and 
the wider political processes of elections and interest group advocacy connect 
Parliament through its Ministers, to the people and so makes government more open 
than it would otherwise be (Aldons, 2001). Broadbent and Laughlin (2003) argue that 
despite this implied notion of accountability governments only make themselves 
accountable in a political rather than a managerial sense. 
 
The Australian conceptual framework directing financial reporting (the „conceptual 
framework‟) identifies two variables as antecedents to usefulness of financial 
information: these are relevance and reliability. Further, the consolidated financial 
reporting technique is identified as a method that produces relevant financial 
information that is useful to users of financial reports for their own decision-making 
purposes. A focus in this study is whether consolidated financial reports are a useful 
tool for the discharge of the accountability for government resources. 
 
1.4 Research questions and study objectives 
 
In specifying the major research question, the achievement of one principal research 
objective is sought. This objective is to extend, significantly, the existing literature 
regarding the antecedents to public sector accountability performance by including a 
new variable: preparer-commanders‟ beliefs about the usefulness of whole-of-
government consolidated financial reporting. On this basis, the major research 
question is presented: 
 
Are whole-of-government consolidated financial reports useful for the 
discharge of financial information accountability by commanders? 
 
1.5 Importance of the topic 
 
The significance of this study relates to the sector under study. Much of the prior 
research on the concepts of accountability, usefulness and of the consolidated 
financial reporting methodology, has been conducted in the context of the private 
sector. Carnegie and Napier (1996) argued that the historical imbalance of financial 
reporting investigation towards the private sector might be reflecting a bias towards 
activities of professional accountancy practice and the use of economic models of 
decision-making based on notions of profit maximisation. Thus the public sector is a 
jurisdiction of interest: and, because it has embarked upon a fundamental change in 
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the organisational structure of its business operations, its approach to profitability 
performance, its accountability for resource management, and the usefulness of its 
reported financial information. With governments generally focussing more attention 
on the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector management and accountability, 
and extending the application of full accrual accounting systems for financial 
reporting purposes, an examination of an important and radically different financial 
reporting methodology in this sector is likely to yield useful information. 
 
1.6 Organisation of this paper 
 
In the next section the main streams of literature which are central to the study topic 
are summarised. The outcome of a questionnaire canvassing the views of public 
sector policy-makers and report preparers of the usefulness of whole-of-government 
consolidated financial reports is then presented. This includes a discussion of the 
research design, questionnaire development, data collection procedures, measures 
used, data preparation procedures and the statistical analysis. Finally the 
contributions made by this study to the relevant literature on the accountability 
performance, usefulness of financial report information and government consolidated 
financial reporting are presented. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Accountability 
 
It has been proposed in this study to investigate the financial information 
accountability paradigm for commanders of whole-of-government consolidated 
financial reports. The accountability paradigm is now identified. 
 
The Macquarie Dictionary (1985) describes accountability as a concept in which 
there is a liability or responsibility to a person, for an act. It describes an accountant 
as one whose profession is to communicate economic information for the judgment 
and decision-making purposes of individuals who seek it. The Australian Pocket 
Oxford Dictionary (1993) extends the notion of accountability to the public and 
especially to persons affected by an organisation‟s operations. The literal meaning of 
accounting according to Day and Klein (1987:Ch1), is for relevant persons to give an 
explanation of what they do, to those to whom they are responsible and whose 
authority empowers them or gives them the right to demand such an explanation. 
Thus accountability is essentially an informing function and raises the questions of 
who is accountable to whom, for what are they accountable, what are the means or 
processes for obtaining these accounts, and what are the results or outcomes, 
including sanctions of all this (Mosher, 1979:p236). 
 
The regime of government organisation in Australia indicates that responsible 
government and accountability are intertwined. Responsible parliamentary 
government (Lucy, 1993:p318; Galligan, 1993; Uhr, 1998:p81) means that the 
ministerial heads of government departments are accountable to an elected 
assembly (Birch, 1996:p20). On the other hand, responsible party government is 
taken to mean accountability to the governing party rather than to any other group or 
institution (Lucy, 1993:p3). Responsible government, by connecting Parliament 
through its Ministers to the electorate, makes government accountable to the 
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electorate. Accountability in this context is associated with the justification or giving 
of reasons for conduct and for responsibilities or authority granted. Justifications 
according to Littleton (1953:p15) provide the rationale for regulated financial 
disclosure. 
 
Guthrie, Parker and English (2003:p7) assert that governments are always 
accountable to Parliament and the electorate for all of their activities. Both State and 
Commonwealth parliaments provide a powerful accountability forum through the 
process of parliamentary scrutiny and committee investigations (Clark, 1999). 
Political opponents also can have a considerable impact on accountability through 
their ability to question government policy and performance. For example, in the 
United States (US) the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 
acknowledged (1987) its belief that accountability is the cornerstone of government 
when it stated that the key objectives of government financial reporting included the 
disclosure of information on a government entity‟s financial condition. The GASB 
also articulated its belief that the public had a right to question government when it 
stated (GASB, 1987:p28) that: 
 
“Governmental accountability is based on the belief that the citizenry has a 
right to know, and a right to receive openly declared facts that may lead to 
public debate by the citizens and their elected representatives.” 
 
Beyond the parliamentary process, accountability is related to the wider political 
processes of elections and interest group advocacy. The media and political 
commentators play an important facilitating role through their freedom of inquiry and 
comment. Hardman (1996:p3) observed a growing disinclination amongst the media, 
academe and Auditors-General to maintain what he described as „... a discreet and 
respectful silence ... and certainly not harass or upset the government of the day with 
audit enquiries ...‟. 
 
A political viewpoint 
 
The work of writers in the area of accountability (Thynne & Goldring, 1987; Uh, 1993, 
1998; Parker & Gould, 1999; Simms & Keating, 1999) reveals that the term 
„accountability‟ is imprecise. Uhr (1993) linked the notion of accountability to its root 
meaning of being called to account for an explanation of one‟s actions or conduct. 
He (Uhr, (1998:p151) stated that „few political terms attract such confusion‟ as 
accountability. Uhr‟s (1993) view is similar to the notion of responsibility expressed 
by Thynne and Goldring (1987) which they described as a situation where officials 
are accountable for the performance of their official tasks and therefore subject to an 
institution‟s or person‟s oversight, direction or request that they provide information 
on their action or justify it before a review authority. Simms and Keating (1999:p116) 
suggested that „there are many different kinds of accountability and that there may 
be clashes between them‟. Parker and Gould (1999) considered that while 
accountability may be difficult to define, it is fundamental to our system of 
government. 
 
Within the hierarchical Westminster system of government administration that has 
historically underpinned the administrative system of the Australian public sector, 
accountability is narrowly confined to a relationship of inequality between two parties. 
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One, a subordinate, is required to report to another, a superior (Mulgan, 1997b) 
without any direct reporting to either parliament or the public. O‟Loughlin (1990:p281) 
suggested that accountability takes place within such a relationship as the „superior 
is expected to have an interest in assessing and improving the quality of the 
performance offered by the subordinate‟. Sumner (1987) provided a broader view of 
accountability under the Westminster tradition that attached obligations to the 
community to any individual rights that were formalised and sanctioned under 
parliamentary sovereignty. Thus it can be seen that in the political sphere, 
accountability is an abstract concept that may change over time, and which can be 
connected to the concept of responsible government. 
 
Over the last three decades am administrative modernisation has occurred within the 
public sector as government operations have become more efficient and effective 
(Weller & Lewis, 1989: Guthrie, 1990; Parker & Guthrie, 1990). As a result of this 
evolving process public servants are now said to be accountable, not only to their 
immediate superiors, but also to a range of oversight bodies such as the Auditor-
General (Reid, 1984). 
 
The suggestion that public servants are directly accountable to members of the 
public has been opposed in some quarters. For instance, by the Department of the 
Prime Minister which published analysis of accountability in the public sector 
(MAB/MIAC, 1991, 1993) in which clear priority is given to the duty of public servants 
to their immediate superiors. This form of relationship precludes any exercise of 
discretion by subordinates in the hierarchical chain of command and probably also 
absolves their professional consciences. However, it would be a mistake to 
associate accountability of public servants exclusively with their duty to Ministers and 
the immediate superiors who direct them, as this is only one aspect of a broader 
structure of accountability in which the general framework is set by the accountability 
of all public officials to the public. It has been assumed that many public servants 
recognise a general duty to the public in addition to their primary duty to their 
superiors (Campbell & Halligan, 1992). The MAB/MIAC Report (1993) in fact, also 
hints at such a wider concept of accountability by acknowledging that scrutiny by 
external review bodies has become an integral and important part of the modern 
accountability process. 
 
Corbett (1992) suggested that public servants may have an inward accountability to 
their professional consciences. It is a general expectation that public servants will act 
responsibly and conscientiously and, in extreme situations, follow their own judgment 
against the instructions of their superiors (Jackson, 1993). Such actions of initiative 
and professional judgment may have implications for the effective application of new 
administrative or regulatory practices such as accounting method choice, or the 
cross-sector transfer of accounting standards. Thus, accountability appears to have 
evolved into a vehicle for reconciliation of the demand for more consultation and 
public participation and the changes to the focus of public management that 
occurred across the 1980s (Chapman, 2000). It has been suggested that the 
emerging scenario is one of tighter control of public servants through notions of 
responsible government (Emy & Hughes, 1993) and accountability (Thynne & 
Goldring, 1987). 
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An agency perspective 
 
Mulgan (2000) provided a view of accountability referring to the obligations that arise 
within a relationship of responsibility where one person or body is responsible to 
another for the performance of particular services. He described the obligations in 
question as first: to account for the performance of duties; and second, to accept 
sanctions or redirection. That is, accountability implies a responsibility by one party 
to another for the performance of duties and adverse consequences for 
unacceptable levels of performance. Mulgan viewed an accountability relationship as 
one of „superior and subordinate or of principal and agent, where subordinates or 
agents are held accountable to, and receive directions from their superiors‟. This 
interpretation is consistent with the concept of Responsible Government where 
Ministers as agents of Parliaments (the Principals) are accountable for their own 
performance and the resources entrusted to them. 
 
Mulgan (2000) contended that in practice an agent is typically the more dominant 
participant and that this phenomenon creates the need to establish the principal‟s 
superiority, or control over the agent. He asserted that accountability requirements 
serve to provide opportunities for otherwise weak principals to impose some controls 
on individuals and organisations that are supposed to be serving in the principal‟s 
interests. The very act of reporting to a superior may be sufficient to induce action 
along the lines preferred by the superior. Similarly, assessments by auditors or other 
oversight bodies may lead to significant direction of, or alterations in, the behaviour 
of those audited. For instance, oversight bodies such as the Auditor-General, 
through their scrutiny and auditing services may provoke responsible behaviour by 
the agent through the prospect of intervention by the principal. 
 
Agency theory posits that a principal controls the actions of the agent by reward if 
the agent faithfully follows the principal‟s instructions, and by termination of the 
agent‟s contract if the principal‟s instructions are not followed (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Watts, 1977). Baiman (1982) provides a specification and survey of agency 
theory. Self (1985:p165-7) argued that agency theory applied to government implies 
that senior bureaucrats are not solely agents of a government Minister, they have an 
independent responsibility for good and equitable administration. 
 
From an agency perspective, a Minister is elected to act on behalf of the public as an 
agent, performing the process of directing and controlling resources for which the 
Minister carries responsibility. Agency theory assumes, however, that an individual 
agent may not always act in the best interests of the principal. Such behaviour 
represents an agency cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and has been described as 
opportunistic behaviour (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978, 1986, 1990). For example, a 
Minister may have a self-interest incentive to abandon policies or proposals that 
might attract adverse media publicity in response to adverse assessments voiced 
through parliament and elsewhere (Mulgan, 1997a). 
 
Ministers (as agents) have a need to be seen to deal effectively and fairly with issues 
which arise within their own sphere of responsibility and thus to enhance their 
political reputation and the electoral fortunes of the government. Ministers, like any 
other chief executives, are required to see that reasonable administrative structures 
are in place and to intervene when problems come to light. They are expected to 
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deal with major departmental problems as they arise. They cannot afford to appear 
inactive or complacent once problems are revealed, and are often held politically 
responsible for any failure to provide prompt and efficient remedies. This indicates 
that there are strong incentives for Ministers to react positively to public criticism. 
Corroborating evidence of the power of publicity and public criticism is provided by 
the continuing resistance of governments to the provision of information that might 
generate criticism of government actions (Mulgan, 2000). 
 
2.2 Commandership and accountability 
 
This form of hierarchical power structure and the element of control provide the ideal 
conditions for Ministers through the ultimate Heads of Government Departments, 
Agencies and Statutory Authorities to command the production of specific 
information. This would include financial information that, as Littleton (1953) pointed 
out „can be clues to good or bad policies‟. Littleton also argued that: 
 
“In accounting, certain aspects of economic truth and some phases of 
statistical truthfulness are skilfully mingled. The fusion is such as to make 
accounting information highly useful to anyone who is interested in the 
activities of a business enterprise.” (Littleton 1953, p:12) 
 
If parliamentary Ministers believe financial information is useful for the discharge of 
their accountability for their conduct and granted responsibilities and authority, then 
commanding their subordinates to accumulate financial data and to prepare financial 
reports sufficient to enable them to discharge that accountability would be rational 
action. Thus, conceptually, the Head of a Government Department, Agency or 
Authority is a report preparer (preparer-commander) who provides financial 
information to a parliamentary Minister who is a user-commander, upon which an 
assessment may be made for ministerial accountability purposes. 
 
Goldberg (1965:p166) suggested that in government affairs there is a hierarchy of 
commanders in which: 
 
“Ministerial heads are at the top-level of command, taking decisions in 
accordance with general Cabinet policy. At lower levels of command are the 
officials of the several Departments who are charged with the task of 
deploying resources within the scope and limits laid down for them by 
budgeting considerations and financial appropriations.” 
 
He argued that in all cases someone has supreme responsibility, and that person 
stands or falls in a personal way by the success or failure of the enterprise. In a 
similar way, he argued, this applies down the hierarchical chain of command to 
„agencies, branches, territories and the like‟ (Goldberg, 1965:p166). Within this 
theoretical framework of control (or command), reporting may be either direct or 
diffused, and the reporting may be a matter of providing the data for the formation of 
an informed opinion. Thus, in the context of public sector financial reporting, 
Goldberg (1965:p167) envisaged financial reports as „reports by commanders to 
commanders, that is, by commanders at one level of command to commanders at a 
higher level ...‟. 
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Goldberg saw a Ministerial Head of a Department as a top-level commander. Such a 
role would entail two separate financial reporting functions: (1) the discharge of 
parliamentary accountability for controlled resources and granted 
responsibilities/authority; and (2) policy-making and ultimate responsibility for report 
preparation. Goldberg (1965) reasoned that accountability was an informing problem 
to be resolved through the administration and organisation of the resources under a 
person‟s command. He described the rationale behind this procedure as 
commandership accounting and that the results of recording external events and 
internal events constitute an expression of the commander‟s activities that may have 
been delegated to others in the hierarchical chain of command. Mulgan 
(1997b:p108) agreed that at each point in this „chains of accountability, officials are 
accountable to their immediate superiors for their own performance and for the 
performance of others below them‟. 
 
In summary, accountability in the public sector appears to occur within a framework 
of superior and subordinate in which the superior is expected to have an interest in 
assessing and improving the quality of the performance offered by the subordinate 
(O‟Loughlin 1990:281). The accountable are subject to oversight that may be in the 
form of an assessment of performance or verification as in the auditing of accounts 
(Uhr ,1993:p1). The superior commonly uses the results of such audits and 
assessments of performance as a basis for controlling (Thynne & Goldring, 1987), 
directing or issuing instructions to those who are accountable (Mulgan, 1997b). In 
addition, it appears that accountability to communicate information about 
performance and controlled resources can be discharged through the provision of 
financial information. 
 
2.3 Sector of interest 
 
The nine jurisdictions directly represented in the Australian Senate and House of 
Representatives were selected as the appropriate sectors for study as they are 
directly represented in parliament and so directly accountable to the electorate. The 
separate jurisdictions that form this primary group of interest establishing the 
principle of responsible government are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Primary Group of Interest 
 
Governments 
Commonwealth (C‟wlth) 
New South Wales (NSW) 
Queensland (Qld) 
South Australia (SA) 
Tasmania (Tas) 
Victoria (Vic) 
Western Australia (WA) 
Northern Territory (NT) 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 
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2.4 Summary 
 
In this section the relevant literature on the major issue of interest in this study was 
considered. This issue is: the accountability model of financial reporting theory. This 
body of literature provides a basis for the present study into the usefulness of whole-
of-government consolidated financial reports for the discharge of financial 
accountability. 
 
3.0 Research Methodology and Analysis of Results 
 
3.1 Survey of preparer-commanders 
 
A survey approach was adopted in this study, using a mailed questionnaire. 
Questionnaire methods of data collection are common in the investigation of financial 
report disclosure. They can provide a first step in identifying and defining features 
that are likely to influence financial reporting policy choices or lobbying behaviour. A 
purposive sampling technique was chosen as a means of producing a sample that is 
typical of the cases of interest. That is, dominant and subordinate preparer-
commanders were chosen as the subjects because the pattern of their responses 
will provide a good idea of the outcome of whole-of-government consolidated 
financial reporting, De Vaus (1995) suggests that such a selection method can 
provide efficient predictions. 
 
The size of the sample selected to receive the questionnaire was relatively small. It 
comprised the Head of the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Treasury, and 
the Auditor-General from each of the Commonwealth, States and Territories. The 
sample size was extended in an effort to capture the views of officers in the role of 
deputies or senior officers. Accordingly, lists of all such officers were accessed from 
relevant organisation charts and contact lists displayed on the Internet. This 
approach generated a list of 52 dominant and subordinate preparer-commanders 
and their deputies and senior advisers. A package comprising the questionnaire and 
relevant accompanying letters was mailed to each Department/Bureau Head and 
Auditor-General. A request to distribute the questionnaire to the identified officers 
and any other relevant officers accompanied each package. 
 
Response rate 
 
Of the 52 questionnaires sent, 17 usable responses were received. Five 
questionnaires were sent to the Northern Territory and six questionnaires to 
Tasmania. Both of these jurisdictions had a response rate of zero. Ryan, Dunstan 
and Stanley (1999) in a study of responses observed a non-response from 
Tasmania. For a variety of reasons the subjects selected in these two jurisdictions 
may not have responded. The concern in this study is whether non-response would 
create problems of size or bias. 
 
In respect to size, probability sampling techniques are unsuitable in this section of 
the study as the concern is not one of generalising from a sample to a large 
population. Instead of being concerned with determining what proportion of the 
population gives a particular response, the study is aimed at obtaining an idea of the 
ranges of responses or ideas that an authoritative sub-set of the population hold. 
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As regards bias, Smith (1989) suggested that suitable allowances could be made 
after obtaining information about the source of the non-response. To this effect, two 
allowances were made in this study in respect to the Northern Territory and to 
Tasmania. Questionnaire data were sought from the Northern Territory report 
preparers however the non-response from this source was not unexpected as the 
majority of questions addressed beliefs and views of preparer-commanders who had 
actually been involved with the preparation of whole-of-government consolidated 
financial reports. At the date of this study, preparer-commanders in the Northern 
Territory had not. Micallef (1997) noted that Tasmania was one of only two 
jurisdictions that had not committed to preparing consolidated financial reports for 
the whole-of-government reporting entity. Relative to a number of measures 
including population and consolidated net assets, Tasmania is less significant than 
the other States. This has implications for the ability of the State to fund the timely 
preparation of the whole-of-government consolidated financial reports. 
 
As responses were received from the Departments of Finance and Bureaus of 
Treasury in five of the seven remaining jurisdictions, and from the offices of the 
Auditors-General in all other jurisdictions, the non-response from the Northern 
Territory and Tasmania was unlikely to be a significant source of bias in the overall 
responses. Of the 17 preparer-commander responses received, seven (41%) 
emanated from the Departments of Finance and Bureaus of Treasury and ten (59%) 
from the offices of the Auditors-General. Accordingly, the responses received were 
considered to provide a strong response from these authoritative sources and the 
response rate was recalculated after eliminating the Northern Territory and 
Tasmania. 
 
3.2 Questionnaire development 
 
Recipients were asked to indicate their views and perceptions on a number of issues 
related to the consolidated financial reporting methodology and to the usefulness of 
whole-of-government consolidated financial information. 
 
Responses on each variable were sought by using a range of questions and 
measurement approaches. The strategy of using multiple-item indicators was chosen 
as a means to ensure more reliable results for each variable than would be the case 
if only a single question were used for each variable. Different measurement 
methods were also adopted and three distinct types of question content: beliefs, 
attitudes and attributes, were included in the instrument. A Likert-style, five-point 
rating scale approach was adopted for the questions relating to the respondents‟ 
beliefs about four primary thematic data categories of Usefulness, Scope, Control 
and Preparation. 
 
3.3 Summary and discussion of data 
 
An analysis and interpretation of respondents‟ beliefs was performed in respect to 
the four primary data themes. The analysis and interpretation was accomplished as 
follows. First the questions were matched to the appropriate data themes. Second, 
descriptive statistics from the responses to each of these questions were computed. 
As questions are designed to address different aspects of the primary themes it was 
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not appropriate to collapse all statistics into a single aggregate. Where several 
questions covered the same issue they were collapsed into single aggregates. 
 
Usefulness of consolidated financial reporting 
 
The results indicate an overall belief that whole-of-government consolidated financial 
reports are useful and that consolidated financial information is comparable. The 
separate measurements showed that while respondents hold a relatively strong view 
that whole-of-government consolidated financial information is comparable on an 
intra-sector basis, they do not believe it is readily comparable to the consolidated 
financial data of other reporting entities. Respondents believe the reports are 
understandable. The quality of understandability is regarded by some as an 
important attribute of effective reporting (Jones, 1988; Schroeder & Gibson, 1990). If 
financial information is not understandable then decisions such as the resource 
allocation decisions of government based on information that has not been properly 
comprehended are questionable (Jackson, 1993). There are two implications of this 
response (1) that in the respondents‟ view consolidated financial information meets 
the criterion of understandability; and (2) respondents‟ believe they understand 
consolidated financial information. The results imply that respondents are not 
convinced that the benefits of preparing consolidated financial reports outweigh the 
costs. However, the results indicate a very strong belief that, in terms of cost-
effectiveness for decision-making, unconsolidated information is much less beneficial 
than consolidated information. 
 
Scope and application of consolidated financial reporting 
 
The responses indicated a belief that some benefits of consolidated financial 
reporting were experienced by both external and internal stakeholders. 
 
Control 
 
The results provide a firm indication of the respondents‟ belief that the concept of 
control is appropriate for whole-of-government consolidated financial reporting. The 
respondents did not appear similarly convinced that ownership was the most 
appropriate criterion for the application of consolidation accounting in the public 
sector. This was not an unexpected outcome given that the organisation of entities 
and services within the public sector has not traditionally been ownership-based, but 
rather, associated with the sources of funding. The implication drawn from these 
results is that preparers believe the concept of control is eminently suited to the 
public sector. The evidence provided support for the concept of the economic entity. 
However, respondents did not support the consolidation of entities being triggered by 
a common economic interest such as might occur if the two entities operate in a 
partnership or joint venture arrangement. 
 
Preparation of consolidated financial reports 
 
In financial reporting the technical and human resources infrastructures are 
important as it is the people and the resources available to them that produce the 
reports. The results indicate a belief that the technical infrastructure of the public 
sector is adequate to cope with the compilation and preparation of consolidated 
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financial reports. The respondents firmly rejected the suggestion that it was 
appropriate to aggregate cash and accrual data. Further, support was provided for 
the notion that consolidated entities should have co-terminous balance dates. 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
The summarised results provided insight into the beliefs of preparer-commanders as 
to the usefulness of consolidated financial reports and their commitment to the cross-
sector transfer of the method. While there appears to be a belief that whole-of-
government consolidated financial information may be useful for decision-making 
purposes, there was relatively less evidence to suggest that information was suitable 
for the purposes of government resource allocation decisions. 
 
After considering the adequacy of the resources dedicated to providing relevant 
training, the preparer-commanders‟ view that they „understand the method‟ does not 
appear to be a matter impeding full implementation of the method. Rather it appears 
that implementation gaps are more likely to be associated with other matters, for 
instance, the loose definition of the control concept and the reluctance of report 
preparers to merge such fundamentally different concepts as the cash and accrual-
based methods of accounting. 
 
4.0 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the issues surrounding the cross-sector 
transfer of a particular reporting practice, consolidated financial reporting, to the 
Australian public sector. A Commander Theory approach was adopted as an 
appropriate framework in which to conduct the examination as Commander Theory 
is ideally suited to the hierarchical system of control over resources that exists within 
the public sector. 
 
The findings provide evidence to support the research question presented in section 
one of whether whole-of-government consolidated financial reporting is useful for the 
discharge of financial information accountability by commanders. 
 
In considering any changed requirements for the content and format of whole-of-
government consolidated financial reports, an appropriate theoretical framework that 
adequately reflects the nature and operations of government needs to be developed. 
Underpinning this process is the need to identify in addition to user-commanders, 
other users of whole-of-government consolidated financial reports and their 
information requirements as these are likely to be very different to those identified in 
the private sector. In the absence of this information, the output of the whole-of-
government consolidation process will not serve any useful purpose other than by 
chance. 
 
While preparer-commanders including Australian Auditors-General and their senior 
advisers supported the consolidated financial reporting method as a means of 
enhancing accountability performance this support cannot be regarded as strong or 
unambiguous. They appear to have been adversely influenced by the potential 
problems they would encounter when interpreting or auditing such weakly defined 
concepts as the economic entity, control and assets. 
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